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CORPORATION OF PRESIDING BISHOP v. AMOS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION BY RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
JENNIFER MARY BURMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The right of an individual to be free from discrimination
is explicitly recognized in the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and
its 1972 amendments.' Of equal concern to Congress is an
individual's first amendment right' to worship or not as he or
she sees fit and to practice his or her beliefs without govern-
mental interference. This first amendment right extends to
religious institutions and gives them the right to appoint
their own clergy, manage their own internal affairs, and con-
trol the advancement and explanation of their own belief sys-
tems. In so doing, religious organizations have often claimed
the right to make employment decisions based on religious
belief, a right denied to secular employers. This claim is espe-
cially pertinent to religiously-affiliated educational institu-
tions. The question of religious discrimination by religious
employers has been addressed both by Congress and by the
courts.
Congress addressed this issue in the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' This act prohibited discrimination generally, but pro-
vided an exemption in section 702 for religious organizations
in their religious activities. In 1972, Congress amended the
act,' broadening the section 702 exemption for religious in-
stitutions by including their secular activities as well. The
1972 amendment also expressly added religious educational
* B.A. 1986, Santa Clara University; J.D. 1989, University of Notre
Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1987-89.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides, in pertinent part, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
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institutions to the list of religious organizations that could
benefit from the section 702 exemption.
The Supreme Court in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos' held this exemption constitutional when applied to the
secular, non-profit activities of a religious group. In so doing,
the Court broke with prior federal court decisions concern-
ing the scope and constitutionality of the exemption. Previ-
ously, courts had extended the exemption only to the reli-
gious activities of religious organizations,7 for fear that a
further extension would result in state sponsorship of reli-
gion in the form of special preference, in violation of the
neutrality principles the Court requires under its present in-
terpretation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment.8
In Amos, the Court held that a broader application of the
exemption did not violate first amendment principles. Justice
White, writing for the Court, stated that the exemption fur-
thered government neutrality in religious affairs by prevent-
ing government interference with the decisions of religious
organizations. Also, the statute did not constitute state spon-
sorship of religion, as the lower courts feared, since the stat-
ute merely allowed religions themselves to further their own
cause.' Concurring, Justice O'Connor recognized that the ex-
emption advanced religion; nevertheless, the exemption was
constitutional because an objective observer would view such
an exemption as legitimate accommodation of religion rather
than illegitimate sponsorship. 0
This note argues that the decision of the Court in Amos is
6. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
7. E.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651
F.2d 277 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982);
EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981); King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F.
Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983); Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Sev-
enth-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). These cases will
be examined, infra, at text accompanying notes 35-51.
8. The Court provided a definition of neutrality in School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Justice Goldberg
wrote, "The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that gov-
ernment neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no
favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that it
work deterrence of no religious belief." Id. at 305 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
9. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
10. Id. at 2874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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sound. Part I of this note examines the legislative history of
section 702 and the lower federal court interpretations of it.
Part II examines the district court opinions in Amos I and II
and the Supreme Court's decision in Amos.
Part 1II examines the Supreme Court's construction of
the establishment clause and its developing notion of accept-
able accommodation. This part argues that, as Justice
O'Connor suggested, government action may sometimes re-
sult in a benefit to religion. In such cases, a distinction must
be made between acceptable accommodation and state spon-
sorship of religion. While courts have consistently struck
down legislation providing direct state aid to religion, they
have generally upheld legislation providing indirect benefits
to religion, such as tax exemptions. This note argues that this
is legitimate, for, while the former at least appears to be di-
rect financial involvement in religion, the latter provides only
an indirect benefit. This symbolic aspect is important, since
even the appearance of establishment of religion may well
create resentment, harmful to both government and religion.
Part III argues that the section 702 exemption provided by
Congress for religious organizations falls within the first cate-
gory of acceptable accommodation, since it allows such orga-
nizations to conduct their affairs without the fear of courts
deciding whether or not an activity is religious.
Finally, Part IV of this note examines the effect of Amos
on religiously-affiliated educational institutions. Although the
Court upheld the exemption in Amos, the precise effect of
this decision on religiously-affiliated educational institutions is
as yet unclear. While courts will likely extend the exemption
to religious primary and secondary schools, courts may be
more reluctant to extend it to religiously-affiliated colleges
and universities. Part IV argues that the exemption should be
extended to these post-secondary schools to avoid inconsis-
tency. Furthermore, there are constitutional difficulties in al-
lowing courts to judge whether a given position at such a
school is religious or secular.
I. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 702
A. Legislative History
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 196411 in re-
11. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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sponse to a growing concern about discrimination in society,
including the area of employment. Title VII of the Act for-
bids discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or terms
and conditions of employment on the basis of an individual's
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'" In order to
avoid conflicts with the first amendment rights of religious
institutions, Congress provided in section 702 an exception
for religious institutions. The section 702 provision ex-
empted such institutions from Title VII "with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on . . . of its religious
activities. '1 3
This exemption was seen as the best way to balance the
right of individuals to be free from discrimination with the
first amendment right of religious institutions to conduct
their religious activities free from governmental interference.
For this reason, Congress extended the exemption only to
the religious activities of a religious organization."4 A syna-
gogue thus would be permitted to hire only Jews to lead ser-
vices, or a Christian-run radio station would be permitted to
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat.
241, 255 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was originally passed as
an expression of Congress' laudable intention to eliminate all
forms of unjustified discrimination in employment, whether such
discrimination be based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. This posed a sharp question under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
as to whether Congress could properly regulate the employment
practices, and specifically the preference for co-religionists, of reli-
gious organizations in matters related to their religious activities.
As a result, the original Title VII contained an exemption from
the operation of Title VII's proscriptions with respect to the em-
ployment of co-religionists to perform work related to the em-
ployer's religious activity.
Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass.
1983).
14. The original House version of § 702, H.R. 7152, granted to reli-
gious organizations a blanket exemption from Title VII. The original ver-
sion read, "This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State or to a religious corporation, associ-
ation, or society." This version was limited by Substitute Senate Amend-
ment No. 656, sponsored by then-Senate Majority Leader Hubert
Humphrey. Senator Humphrey's amendment later became law. See 110
CONG. REC. 12, 818 (1964); see also McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d
553, 558 (5th Cir.) (discussing the legislative history of the 1964 version of
§ 702), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
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hire only Christians to broadcast its religious message, with-
out governmental intrusion. In order to protect individuals
from discrimination in other areas, Congress did not allow a
religious organization to discriminate on religious ground in
hiring for a non-religious position, such as a secretary or a
janitor. Nor could such an organization discriminate on other
than religious grounds; for example, racial or sexual discrimi-
nation not based on a religious belief would not come under
the exemption. Moreover, a religiously-affiliated business
whose primary purpose was deemed religious in nature was
permitted to hire only members of its own sect, while a relig-
iously-affiliated business whose purpose was considered secu-
lar would not have the benefit of the exemption.
Further, private and religiously-affiliated schools were
provided a separate exemption under section 703.15 Under
this section, these schools were permitted to consider the reli-
gious background of any of their employees when making
personnel decisions."6
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of
1964, recodifying section 702 under the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972.7 Concerned that the section 702
exemption was unnecessarily narrow, Senators Samuel J. Er-
vin and James B. Allen introduced an amendment to section
702 which would broaden the exemption afforded to reli-
gious organizations by expanding it to include all activities of
a religious organization, not only those activities deemed reli-
gious. Senators Ervin and Allen were concerned that any gov-
ernment interference with religious institutions in the form
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
16. Section 703 provides, in pertinent part,
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, col-
lege, university, or other educational institution or institution of
learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if
such school, college, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned,
supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a
particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the
curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educa-
tional institution or institution of learning is directed toward the
propagation of a particular religion.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(e)(2), 78 Stat. 241,
256 (1964).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
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of regulation would implicate first amendment interests of
such institutions in their freedom to conduct themselves as
they see fit. Said Senator Ervin, "When the Federal Govern-
ment begins to grasp the power of things of the Lord, it is
reaching a state of government interference which is alien to
the first amendment. The first amendment was designed to
build a wall of separation between church and state.''1 Con-
gress adopted the Ervin-Allen amendment; section 702 now
reads, in pertinent part:
This subchapter shall not apply to ... a religious corpora-
tion, association, educational institution, or society with re-
spect to the employment of individuals of a particular reli-
gion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or so-
ciety of its activities."
Section 703 remained unchanged by the 1972 amend-
ments." However, the inclusion in section 702 of education
institutions in the list of religious organizations arguably
broadened the exemption for such institutions. Not only are
they entitled to discriminate on the basis of religious prefer-
ence, but they are also now entitled to the exemption pro-
vided in section 702. The precise effect of this depends to a
large extent on the interpretation given to section 702.
B. Difficulties in Interpretation of Section 702
The language of section 702 is open to a number of in-
terpretations, and the federal courts have struggled with it
since the adoption of the 1972 amendments. Courts were
faced with defining religious discrimination and which activi-
ties of religious organizations were constitutionally entitled to
the exemption.
18. 118 CONG. REC. 1977 (1972).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). "The sponsors of the 1972
amendment were chiefly concerned to preserve the statutory power of sec-
tarian schools and colleges to discriminate on religious grounds in the hir-
ing of all their employees." King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 54
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974). The court, citing the legisla-
tive history of the 1972 amendment, stated that Senators Ervin and Allen,
when discussing the effects of the amendment, "invariably adverted to its
effect on religious educational institutions." King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 54
n.6 (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
AcT OF 1972, at 844, 846, 848-52 (1972)). For this reason, § 702 is espe-
cially pertinent to religiously-affiliated schools.
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1. Religious Discrimination
First, section 702 allows religious institutions to discrimi-
nate in hiring and firing "individuals of a particular reli-
gion." If interpreted narrowly, this allows a religious organ-
ization to prefer members of a particular sect over members
of other sects or over those not affiliated with any sect. For
example, a Catholic school would be allowed to hire a Catho-
lic over a non-Catholic. But no other form of discrimination,
such as sexual discrimination, would be allowed. Thus, a
Catholic school would not be allowed to prefer a Catholic
man over a Catholic woman in hiring. While this narrow in-
terpretation would advance the state's interest in preventing
other forms of discrimination, a religious institution may
have a religious interest in hiring only men or only women
for certain positions"' and thus may see such an interpreta-
tion as undue government interference.
A broader interpretation of section 702 would allow such
institutions to discriminate on any grounds, including gender,
if such grounds had a religious basis. Thus, a Catholic school
that wished to hire only men for certain positions would be
permitted to do so, if such a preference were based on Catho-
lic belief. Although this broader view would provide individu-
als applying for such positions less protection from discrimi-
nation in the market place, religious organizations may see
this as a grant of more freedom to perform their activities.
2. Religious Activities
Second, the 1972 amendment to section 702 extended
the exemption to the carrying on by a religious organization
"of its activities."2 The question then becomes to which ac-
tivities this exemption extends. It is established that a reli-
gious institution may choose its own leaders under section
702,4 but it is not clear whether a religiously-affiliated busi-
ness may discriminate in hiring what are usually considered
"secular" employees. A narrow interpretation would extend
section 702 only to those activities deemed to be religious.
For instance, a Jewish school could discriminate in hiring reli-
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
22. For example, a religious organization which restricts ordination
to men may want to hire only men to teach theology or act as spiritual
counselors.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
24. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 896 (1972).
1988]
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gion teachers, but a Christian-run clothing store could not re-
fuse to hire a non-Christian janitor. This interpretation
avoids giving an unfair advantage to religious organizations
in the market place and thus escapes the perception of gov-
ernment favoritism toward religion. However, an activity
may have both religious and secular components. Confusion
over this point could involve courts in a determination of
whether an activity was part of a religious belief or not, a
determination which a religious institution may resist. More
importantly, such a determination would amount to a court
making religious decisions for religious groups, a serious im-
plication of first amendment entanglement25 and free exer-
cise concerns.
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to sec-
tion 702 indicates that the sponsors intended the broadest in-
terpretation of that section. Senator Ervin asserted that the
purpose of the amendment was to "take the political hands of
Caesar off of the institutions of God, where they have no
place to be." 6 Under this broad interpretation, a religious
organization may discriminate in any of its activities, whether
religious or secular in nature. Thus, a religiously-affiliated
restaurant would be permitted to hire on a preferential basis,
even in hiring for obviously secular positions, such as bus-
boys. This interpretation affords religious institutions the
greatest margin of freedom in conducting their affairs as they
wish. If interpreted too broadly, however, the exemption
may amount to an improper benefit to religion in commercial
areas where secular competitors do not have the same advan-
tage. Further, a religious organization has much less of a
claim to first amendment protection in the commercial area
than it does in the areas of education or worship."
C. Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Section 702
1. Religious Discrimination
Despite the call in the legislative history for a broad in-
terpretation, lower federal courts nonetheless have construed
the section 702 exemption narrowly. For example, courts had
25. The Supreme Court expressed concern over excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
613 (1971). For further discussion of Lemon, see infra notes 73-78 and ac-
companying text.
26. 118 CONG. REc. 4503 (1972).
27. See, e.g., Marshall & Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations
Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 324 (1986).
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generally limited the section 702 exemption to those situa-
tions in which an organization discriminates on the basis of
religious preference; they had been reluctant to extend the
exemption to sexual discrimination. In EEOC v. Pacific Press
Publishing Association,28 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court's ruling that a publishing house, affiliated with the Sev-
enth-Day Adventist Church, had violated Title VII when it
denied female employees monetary allowances given to simi-
larly situated male employees. The court held that, while the
section 702 exemption permits religious institutions to prefer
members of their own faith, "religious employers are not im-
mune from liability for discrimination based on race, sex, na-
tional origin ... "29
Similarly, in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists,8" the Fourth Circuit stated that the "statutory ex-
emption applies to one particular reason for employment de-
cision-that based on religious preference. It was open to
Congress to exempt from Title VII the religious employer,
not simply one basis of employment, and Congress plainly did
not."81
In construing section 702, then, lower courts had limited
religious institutions to hiring decisions based on religious
preference; sexual discrimination by such employers is sub-
ject to Title VII scrutiny. Therefore, religiously-affiliated
28. 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
29. Id. at 1276. Pacific Press had argued that Title VII exempted its
employment practices from coverage. The court rejected this argument,
stating that the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to § 702 indi-
cated that Congress intended to broaden the exemption to include all activ-
ities of a religious organization, but not discrimination on any basis other
than religion. Id.
30. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3333
(1986).
31. Id. at 1166-67. The plaintiff in Rayburn had been denied a pas-
toral position in the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. She charged the
church with sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Although the court rejected the church's argument that § 702
granted the church an exemption for sexual discrimination, the court held
that the "role of an associate in pastoral care is so significant in the expres-
sion and realization of Seventh-day Adventist beliefs that state intervention
in the appointment process would excessively inhibit religious liberty." Id.
at 1168. For other cases construing § 702 as limiting religious organiza-
tions to discrimination based on religious preference, see EEOC v. South-
western Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. Unit A July
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626
F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
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schools may discriminate on the basis of religious preference
under both section 702 and section 703, but their inclusion
in section 702 does not allow them to discriminate on the
other grounds.
2. Religious Activities
Courts have consistently applied the exemption to reli-
gious activities. In McClure v. Salvation Army,32 the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's dismissal of a complaint by a
Salvation Army minister, who sued the Salvation Army alleg-
ing sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII. The court
held that Title VII does not apply to the relationship be-
tween a church and its ministers: "The minister is the chief
instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose.
Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recog-
nized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.""3 Government regu-
lation of the choosing of ministers would directly involve the
state in the internal affairs of religion, a clear free exercise
violation. Thus, the court concluded that Title VII was not
intended to apply to the church-minister relationship.3
Notwithstanding the breadth of the legislative history,
courts were hesitant to apply section 702 to the secular activi-
ties of religious organizations. For example, in Whitney v.
Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists," the district
court refused to extend the McClure exemption to the rela-
tionship between a church and its clerical help. The court
emphasized that the employment of a typist does not touch
32. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). The
court in McClure dealt with the § 702 exemption before the 1972 amend-
ments. The court also limited its decision to the church-minister relation-
ship and expressly refrained from discussing any other relationship. Id. at
555. However, its definition of the church-minister relationship is perti-
nent here and has been relied upon by other courts in construing § 702
since the 1972 amendments. See, e.g., Rayburn v. General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3333 (1986); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651
F.2d 277 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982);
EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981); Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Ad-
ventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
33. McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
34. See also Rayburn, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that
government interference with a church's choice of its leaders would consti-
tute a burden on the church's free exercise of religion), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3333 (1986).
35. 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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"so close to the heart of church administration as to be pro-
tected by the First Amendment from the commands of Title
VII."" Nor would the Fifth Circuit extend its McClure hold-
ing to the relationship between a seminary and its support
personnel in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Semi-
nary." The court there asserted that the state has an interest
in preventing discrimination among non-religious employees:
"Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that the
employment relationship between a church and all of its em-
ployees is a matter of purely ecclesiastical concern."3 8 Be-
cause the support staff of the seminary are not ministers in
the McClure sense, the court held that section 702 did not
exempt the seminary from EEOC filing requirements.3 9
The Fifth Circuit similarly held that the relationship be-
tween a religious educational institution and its faculty is not
exempt from Title VII in EEOC v. Mississippi College."0 In this
case, the EEOC sought enforcement of a subpoena issued in
connection with its investigation of the college on a sexual
discrimination charge."1 The college refused to comply on
first amendment grounds. Although the college has a written
policy of preference to Baptists in hiring, in order to create
an atmosphere of piety, the court found "[t]hat the faculty
members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing
Christians does not serve to make the terms and conditions of
their employment matters of church administration and thus
36. Id. at 1368. The court stated that the facts in this case did not fall
within McClure, since a typist is not a minister.
37. 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
905 (1982).
38. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d at 287.
39. Id. at 286. Section 709(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c), requires employers to keep records relevant
to determining whether the employer has committed unlawful employment
practices. Pursuant to § 709(c), the EEOC requires both public and private
institutions of higher education to file biennially the Higher Education
Staff Information Report EEOC-6. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.50 (1980). The
EEOC-6 requires employment information regarding every employee, in-
cluding race and gender. The court here held that, because the EEOC was
simply gathering statistical information, the burden on the seminary was
"largely hypothetical." 651 F.2d at 286. Because the "resulting relation-
ship between the Seminary and the government is ... minimal," the court
held that the filing requirement did not violate the establishment clause.
Id.
40. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
41. Dr. Patricia Summers, a part-time psychology professor, had
been denied a full-time position. The college had hired a man to fill the
position instead. 626 F.2d at 479.
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of purely ecclesiastical concern."4 The court thus applied
section 702 narrowly.
Two courts which considered section 702 as applied to
the secular activities of religious organizations expressed
doubts as to the constitutionality of the exemption when so
extended. In King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC,' the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit affirmed an FCC order to King's Garden, an
inter-denominational radio station licensee. The FCC had
found that King's Garden had been discriminating on reli-
gious grounds in its employment decisions, including those
not related to the broadcasting of its religious message. The
FCC ordered it to submit a statement of future hiring prac-
tices, and King's Garden refused to comply, invoking section
702."4 In dicta, the court stated that the 1972 amendment to
section 702, when applied to the activities of a religious or-
ganization, including those traditionally defined as secular,
constitutes state sponsorship of religion, in that it "invites re-
ligious groups, and them alone, to impress a test of faith on
job categories, and indeed whole enterprises, having nothing
to do with the exercise of religion. '4 This can only be con-
strued, declared the court, as special preference." The court
indicated its reservations in extending section 702 to secular
activities since, under section 702, religious organizations re-
ceive favoritism, even when they choose to enter the secular,
corporate economy.'7
The district court of Massachusetts expressed similar res-
ervations in Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor.4" Here, the
court dismissed the complaint of a man claiming religious dis-
crimination by the newspaper. 4'9 The court held that the
newspaper was a religious activity of a religious organization
42. Id. at 485. The court held that, because the application of Title
VII could have "only a minimal impact on the College's religion based
practices," it did not violate the establishment clause. Id. at 487.
43. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
44. 498 F.2d at 52. The court found that Congress, in enacting the
1972 amendments to § 702, did not intend for § 702 to apply to rulings by
the FCC under the Communications Act. This was because § 702 applies
only to purely private industries, and broadcasting is not wholly private;
"licensed broadcasters must meet FCC-imposed obligations inapplicable to
the private sector generally." Id. at 58-59.
45. Id. at 55.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 57.
48. 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983).
49. Id. at 975.
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and therefore the exemption applied.50 However, the court
in dicta asserted that section 702, if applied to the secular
activities of a religious organization, may well constitute fa-
voritism of religion over non-religion, in violation of the first
amendment.5
Courts have been reluctant to allow religious educational
institutions to rely solely on the exemption provided in sec-
tion 703, which allows them to inquire into the religious
background of prospective employees. Instead, courts have
brought section 702 into the inquiry. Section 702, construed
so narrowly, would exempt a religious educational institution
only in the hiring and firing of personnel engaged in reli-
gious activities. A Methodist high school, for example, would
be able to hire only Methodists to lead school services or
teach religion. Whether the same school would be able to so
discriminate in hiring an English teacher or a secretary would
depend on whether such positions were considered religious
or secular. It was this sort of confusion that led to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Amos.52
II. CORPORATION OF PRESIDING BISHOP V. AMOS
In Amos, the Court held that the section 702 exemption
is constitutional when applied to the secular, non-profit activi-
ties of a religious organization. This section examines the
facts of Amos, the district court's opinions in Amos I and II,"
and the decision of the Supreme Court.
50. Id. at 978. The plaintiff argued that the newspaper was not a reli-
gious activity because it carried articles of a secular nature. The court re-
jected this argument, citing the "close and significant relationship existing
between the Christian Science Church, the Publishing Society and the
Monitor; or the declared purpose . . . of the Monitor to promulgate and
advance the tenets of Christian Science." Id. For this reason, the court
found that the Monitor was a religious activity.
51. Id. at 978-79. The court stated:
It is not mandated under the Constitution that Congress prohibit
discrimination on grounds of religion in private sector employ-
ment. However, having elected to do so in the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Congress is under a constitutional obligation to do so in
a way that neither favors nor disfavors secular, private sector en-
terprises that may be conducted by religious organizations .... It
is well established that the expression of a preference for all reli-
gion is as constitutionally infirm as a preference for, or a discrimi-
nation against, a particular religion.
Id. (emphasis in original).
52. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
53. After Amos I, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, ad-
ding an additional named plaintiff by stipulation of the parties. 618 F.
Supp. 1013, 1016 (D. Utah 1985).
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A. The Facts
The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corpora-
tion of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints (COP) are Utah corporations owned by the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon
Church). The COP operated both the Beehive Clothing Mills
and the Deseret Gymnasium. The Beehive Clothing Mills
manufactured and distributed clothing and temple garments;
the Deseret Gymnasium was a gymnasium open to the public.
Deseret Industries was a division of the Mormon Church's
Welfare Services Department and ran several thrift stores
which refurbished goods and sold used clothing to the public.
Also, Deseret Industries provided jobs and training to handi-
capped and mentally retarded persons and others who could
not find work.64
Christine J. Amos was employed in the personnel depart-
ment of Beehive. Others were employed as seamstresses at
Beehive. Arthur Frank Mayson was employed at Deseret
Gymnasium as a building engineer. Ralph L. Whitaker was
employed by Deseret Industries as a truck driver." These in-
dividuals were fired from their jobs because they either failed
or refused to satisfy the Mormon Church's requirements for
a temple recommend."' Amos and others filed a complaint
against the CPB and the COP alleging that the defendants
discriminated against them on religious grounds in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that the sec-
tion 702 exemption from anti-discrimination laws violates the
establishment clause of the first amendment. The defendants
moved to dismiss the action or, in the alternative, for sum-
mary judgment, on the grounds that section 702 of the Act
relieves them of liability.57
54. Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791, 796
(D. Utah 1984).
55. Id. at 796; 618 F. Supp. at 1016.
56. Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 796. A temple recommend is a certificate
which states that one is a member of the Mormon Church and eligible to
attend its temples. It is issued only to those who observe the Church's stan-
dards of conduct. Id.
57. Id.
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B. Amos I
The district court in Amos 8 denied the defendants' mo-
tions. The court considered whether section 702 is constitu-
tional when applied to the secular activities of a religious or-
ganization. In doing so, the court applied the three part test
set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman,59 which provides that (1) the
challenged statute must have a secular purpose, (2) its princi-
ple or primary effect must neither inhibit nor advance reli-
gion, and (3) must not foster excessive entanglement of gov-
ernment with religion.6" After examining the legislative
history of section 702, the court concluded that it had the
legitimate secular purpose of assuring government neutrality
in religious affairs, in that it prevented government interfer-
ence with the decision-making process of religious organiza-
tions." However, the court found that section 702 had the
primary effect of advancing religion.6" The court stated that
the exemption had no historical tradition and, more impor-
tantly, singled out religious organizations and only granted
them permission to engage in activities which advance reli-
gious beliefs and practices.63 Thus, the court concluded that
section 702, when applied to the secular activities of a reli-
gious institution, fails the second prong of the Lemon test and
violates the establishment clause.
The court then had to determine whether the activity in
question was religious. If it was, the section 702 exemption
would permit the discrimination. To make this determina-
tion, the court developed a three-pronged test. In doing so,
the court focused on the exemption required by the constitu-
tion, namely, that the government may not interfere with
matters of church administration or with the decision as to
58. 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984).
59. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For further discussion of the Lemon test, see
infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
60. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
61. Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 812. The court stated that the "legislative
goal of assuring that the government remains neutral and does not meddle
in religious affairs by interfering with the decision-making process in reli-
gions is a valid secular purpose."
62. In examining whether § 702 violates the second prong of the
Lemon test, the court stated that the proper inquiry was not whether the
statute had the "primary" effect of advancing religion, but whether "the
law in question has the direct and immediate, or substantial, effect of ad-
vancing or inhibiting religion." Id. at 820.
63. Id. at 825.
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who will profess the group's beliefs." First, the court must
examine the nexus between the activity in question and the
religious organization, especially in its financial matters, man-
agement, and day-to-day operations. Second, the court must
look at the relationship between the primary function of the
activity and matters of church administration or church be-
liefs or rituals. If the relationship in both cases is substantial,
the court need look no further and may declare that the ac-
tivity is religious. If the second relationship is tenuous, the
court must look at a third relationship: that between the na-
ture of the employee's job and matters of church administra-
tion, tenets, or rituals. Where this relationship is substantial,
the court must declare the activity religious and thus exempt
under section 702.65
Under this three-prong analysis, the court held that Des-
eret Gymnasium was not a religious activity for purposes of
section 702. Applying the first prong, the court found that a
tie did exist between the Mormon Church and the every day
functions of Deseret Gymnasium. However, under the second
prong, the court found that the relationship between the pri-
mary function of Deseret Gymnasium and matters of Mor-
mon church administration and beliefs was tenuous. The pri-
mary function of Deseret Gymnasium was to serve as an
athletic facility, open to the general public, not as a teacher
of the Mormon faith. The Mormon Church does not require
religious discrimination in employment, nor does it require
its members to perform any kind of physical exercise. There-
fore, no relationship exists between the rituals or tenets of
the Mormon Church and the primary function of Deseret
Gymnasium. Under the third prong, the court looked at the
relationship between the nature of Mayson's job and matters
of Mormon church administration or beliefs. It found that
none of Mayson's duties as building engineer were tied to the
administration or beliefs of the Mormon faith. The court
therefore held that Deseret Gymnasium was not a religious
activity and was not exempt from Title VII under section
702.0 The court entered summary judgment for Mayson.61
64. The court cited King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 56
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974), explaining the constitutional
requirement that the "Free Exercise Clause precludes governmental inter-
ference with ecclesiastical hierarchies, church administration, and appoint-
ment of clergy." Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 799 n.7.
65. Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 799.
66. Id. at 802.
67. Id. at 831.
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A closer question was posed by the claims of the Beehive
employees. Because the facts in the record were limited, the
court reserved judgment as to whether Beehive was a reli-
gious activity. 8
C. Amos H
In Amos II,1' the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
on the Beehive and the Deseret Industries claims. As to the
Beehive claim, the court concluded that summary judgment
was inappropriate, since genuine issues of material fact
remained."0
The court then applied the three-prong test set out in
Amos I to determine whether the activities of Deseret Indus-
tries were religious in nature. Deseret Industries was founded
by the Mormon Church to provide employment for Church
members and charity for its members in need; the very rea-
son for its founding was to fulfill the Mormon Church's belief
in helping its needy members. Applying the first prong, the
court found that a substantial tie existed between the Mor-
mon Church and Deseret Industries. Applying the second
prong, the court found a substantial tie between the charita-
ble function of Deseret Industries and the beliefs of the Mor-
mon Church. Therefore, Deseret Industries fell under the
exemption of section 702 and was entitled to discriminate on
the basis of religion. The court granted summary judgment
for the defendants. 1
D. The Supreme Court
The defendants appealed the district court's judgment in
Amos I. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the exemption provided in section 703 is constitutional when
applied to the secular acts of non-profit religious organiza-
tions.7 ' The Court held that the exemption did apply to such
secular activity, revising the lower court decision.
68. Id. at 802-03. The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to
discovery on the manufacture and distribution of garments by Beehive, the
tax-exempt status of Beehive, employees of Beehive who were or were not
Mormons, Beehive's contracts with private enterprises, and the hiring prac-
tices of Beehive's plants in Mexico and England.
69. 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Utah 1985).
70. Id. at 1016.
71. Id. at 1030.
72. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2867
(1987).
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The Supreme Court held that section 702 when applied
to secular activities, satisfies the requirements of the Lemon
test. Lemon's first requirement, that the statute in question
have a legitimate secular purpose, serves to prevent the gov-
ernment from advocating a particular viewpoint in matters of
religion. It does not require that a statute be unrelated to
religion. Thus, a statute may legitimately prevent the govern-
ment from interfering with the decisions of religious organi-
zations concerning their religious missions. The Court
pointed out that a religious institution may well feel
threatened by the possibility of a judge deciding which of its
activities is religious, and this fear may affect its actions.7 8 For
this reason, the Court agreed with the district court's judg-
ment that section 702 satisfies the first requirement under
Lemon .74
Second, the Lemon test requires that a statute have a pri-
mary effect that neither inhibits nor advances religion. In or-
der to have forbidden effects under Lemon, the government
itself must be advancing religion by its own activities. It is not
enough to say, as did the district court, that a statute allows
churches to advance religion, since that is their reason for
existing.75 Establishment of religion, according to the foun-
ders, consists of government sponsorship of religion,7 6 not
merely allowing religions to advance their own cause. No evi-
73. The Court noted that the Amos case itself presented a good exam-
ple of this threat. The distinction between Deseret Industries, which the
district court found to be a religious activity, and the Gymnasium, which
the district court found to be secular, is "rather fine," and both the CPB
and the COP view the two as an expression of their religious values. Id. at
2868 n.14 (citing Brief for Appellants at 6-8, 19 (No. 86-179)).
74. Id. at 2868.
75. The Court here stated that religious organizations have benefit-
ted from a number of laws which allow them to advance their own cause.
The Court cited Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a
property tax exemption for properties used by religious organizations for
worship), and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding
loans of books to school children, including parochial school children). The
fact that a statute gives special consideration to religious groups has never
rendered a statute per se invalid. This would "run contrary to the teaching
of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation of religion under
the Establishment Clause." Id. at 2868-69.
76. The Court cites Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970),
which states that "for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, finan-
cial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."
Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2869 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 668). For further discus-
sion of this issue, see infra note 90.
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dence existed here which would imply that section 702 con-
stitutes government sponsorship of Deseret Gymnasium,
since it was the Mormon Church, not the government, who
was seeking to advance religion. Thus, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument of the district court that section 702
failed the second requirement of Lemon."
The Court pointed out that the government may accom-
modate religious institutions without violating the establish-
ment clause, so long as such accommodation does not amount
to sponsorship and does not interfere with religion. A statute
having the legitimate secular purpose of alleviating govern-
ment interference with religion satisfies the third Lemon re-
quirement. The section 702 exemption avoids the intrusion
of courts into religious matters by preventing courts from de-
ciding which of an institution's activities are religious and
which are not, as did the district court. The statute thus en-
courages a separation between church and state.7 8 For this
reason, the Court found the exemption constitutional as ap-
plied to the secular, non-profit activities of religious
organizations.
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan emphasized two im-
portant first amendment values: the right of religious institu-
tions and the right of individuals.7 9 Religious organizations
have a first amendment right to run their own internal af-
fairs, free from government control. These organizations
provide their members with a community which fosters value
and meaning for them. Thus, extending the exemption to re-
ligious organizations advances the religious freedom of indi-
viduals. o On the other hand, section 702 allows religious in-
stitutions to confront an individual such as Mayson with a
choice between employment and religious belief. This possi-
77. Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2869. The Court also rejected the district
court's argument that § 702 was unsupported by a long historical tradition.
The Court stated that "the fact that Congress concluded after eight years
that the original exemption was unnecessarily narrow is a decision entitled
to deference, not suspicion." Id.
78. Id. at 2870.
79. Id. at 2870 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 2871-72 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan emphasized
that "for many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large mea-
sure from participation in a larger religious community. Such a community
represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not re-
ducible to a mere aggregation of individuals." Id. at 2871 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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bility of coercion is in direct conflict with the individual free-
dom guaranteed by the first amendment. 1
Brennan argued that the ideal situation would be to re-
strict the section 702 exemption to the religious activities of
religious organizations. But an activity is almost never clearly
religious or secular. The result would be further government
entanglement in religion and the concern that a religious or-
ganization would let the possibility of a lawsuit affect its oper-
ations."2 A categorical exemption for non-profit activities
provides a balance between these concerns. That an organiza-
tion is non-profit is an indication that it operates with a reli-
gious purpose not to make money. These same considera-
tions do not arise with respect to for-profit institutions
engaged in commerce."
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, also
stressed the differences between profit and non-profit organi-
zations when determining the constitutionality of section
702." She criticized the Court's application of the second
prong of the Lemon test, in particular the distinction drawn
between allowing religions to further their cause and the gov-
ernment directly advancing religion. Any government bene-
fit, short of actual preaching by government officials, may be
characterized as allowing religious organizations to advance
religion. The first step a court should take, she suggested, is
to recognize that such a statute will have the effect of advanc-
ing religion." Second, a court must distinguish between ille-
81. Id. at 2872 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82.
A religious organization therefore would have an incentive to
characterize as religious only those activities about which there
likely would be no dispute, even if it genuinely believed that reli-
gious commitment was important in performing other tasks as
well. As a result, the community's process of self-definition would
be shaped in part by the process of litigation.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
83.
In contrast to a for-profit corporation, a non-profit organization
must utilize its earnings to finance the continued provision of the
goods or services it furnishes, and may not distribute any surplus
to the owners. . . .This makes plausible a church's contention
that an entity is not operated simply in order to generate revenues
for the church, but that the activities themselves are infused with
a religious purpose . . . .Non-profit activities therefore are most
likely to present cases in which characterization of the activities as
religious or secular will be a close question.
Id. at 2872-73 (Brennan, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 2874 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
85. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), Justice O'Connor criti-
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gitimate rewards to religion and legitimate accommodation
of religion. The test of a statute should be whether an objec-
tive observer would understand it as government endorse-
ment of religion. Only in that event would the statute be un-
constitutional.86 For these reasons, Justice O'Connor agreed
with the difference drawn by Justice Brennan between a non-
profit and a for-profit institution when applying section 702
as an endorsement of religion. Thus, she concludes that sec-
tion 702 is constitutional when applied to a non-profit organi-
zation of a religious institution.87
III. SECTION 702 AS ACCEPTABLE ACCOMMODATION
A. Strict Separation v. Acceptable Accommodation
The first amendment of the constitution provides that
the government "[s]hall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."8
Thus, Congress is prohibited from establishing an official re-
ligion and inhibiting the rights of the people to worship or
not as they see fit. Beyond this, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped a notion of what constitutes an establishment of religion
cized the Court's application of the Lemon test. There she stated that the
Lemon test would invalidate legislation relieving religious observers from
government imposed duties, since such legislation would have the religious
purpose of advancing religion. At the same time, any legislation which ben-
efits religion can be said to accommodate religion, thus vitiating the estab-
lishment clause. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862,
2874 (1987) (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 82 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
O'Connor stated that the majority's application of the second Lemon prong
came close to the second option:
The Court seems to suggest that the "effects" prong of the Lemon
test is not at all implicated as long as the government action can
be characterized as "allowing" religious organizations to advance
religion . . . .This distinction seems to me to obscure far more
than to enlighten . . . .The Church had the power to put May-
son to a choice of qualifying for a temple recommend or losing his
job because the government had lifted from religious organizations
the general regulatory burden imposed by § 702.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 2874-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Citing Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984)(O'Connor, J., concurring), O'Connor
stated that the question of whether an objective observer would view the
endorsement of religion "is not a question of simple historical fact. Al-
though evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the question is . . . in
large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpre-
tation of social facts." Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2875.
87. Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2874.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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and government interference with free exercise. The Court
has moved away from its earlier interpretation of the first
amendment-that it erected a strict "wall of separation" be-
tween church and state-and has held more recently that the
government may accommodate religion without violating the
first amendment.
1. Strict Separation
In Everson v. Board of Education," the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated its notion of strict separation between government
and religion required by the first amendment. After tracing
the evils of state-sponsored religion through the history of
Europe and of the early United States, Justice Black con-
cluded that the first amendment "erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregna-
ble." 90 For this reason, the state may no more inhibit religion
than it may sponsor it. The Court upheld a New Jersey stat-
ute which authorized the board of education to reimburse
parents of public and private school children for bus fare for
the children to and from school. Justice Black wrote that,
without this program, some children might be prevented
from going to church-related schools; for him, this would be
an impermissible inhibition of the free exercise of their
religion."
In spite of agreement among the Justices on the strict
separation theory, four Justices disagreed with the result. Jus-
tice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, argued that the
89. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
90. Id. at 18. According to Laurence H. Tribe, the views of the foun-
ders fell into three categories: (1) the evangelical view of Roger Williams,
under which separation between church and state meant that the state
must foster a climate favorable to all religion by giving aid but not exercis-
ing control; (2) the Jeffersonian view, under which separation of church
and state would be complete so as to protect the state from religion; and
(3) the Madisonian view, under which both religion and government
should be separate so that each could achieve its highest goal. The Su-
preme Court, especially Justice Black, has relied on the history of the first
amendment in interpreting it and has considered the ideas of Jefferson and
Madison especially relevant. Thus, the Court construed the intent of the
founders to be a strict separation between church and state. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 817-18 (1978). However, Tribe
points out that "the actual history of the establishment clause may belie
this interpretation. At least some evidence exists that, for the Framers, the
establishment clause was intended largely to protect state religious estab-
lishments from national displacement." Id. at 819.
91. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18.
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New Jersey statute violated the strict separation of church
and state by spending tax funds to aid religious education. 92
Similarly, Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter,
Jackson, and Burton, argued that the first amendment was
written to "create a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by com-
prehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support
for religion. '"' The New Jersey law violated this principle by
aiding religious schools.
This separationist view was echoed in McCollum v. Board
of Education.4 There the Court struck down an Illinois pro-
gram under which children in public school could receive re-
ligious instruction on public school premises." Relying on Ev-
erson, the Court stated that the program violated the
separation between church and state required by the first
amendment: "For the First Amendment rests upon the pre-
mise that both religion and government can best work to
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other
within its respective sphere.'" 6
Justice Reed, however, in his dissent, planted the seed
for the Court's later interpretation of the religion clauses. Af-
ter stating the history of the religion clauses and listing past
practices involving both the state and religion, Justice Reed
argued that the religion clauses "do not bar every friendly
gesture between church and state. It is not an absolute prohi-
bition against every conceivable situation where the two may
work together, any more than the other provisions of the
92. Justice Jackson wrote that the first amendment was
[s]et forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its rigidity. It was
intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to
keep religion's hands off the state, and, above all, to keep bitter
religious controversy out of public life by denying to every denom-
ination any advantage from getting control of public policy or the
public purse. Those great ends I cannot but think are immeasura-
bly compromised by today's decision.
Id. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
94. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
95. Under the Illinois program, religion teachers, employed by reli-
gious groups, were allowed once a week to come into public school and
teach 30-minute religion classes on the basis of a request card signed by the
parents of the child. Children who did not attend religion classes were re-
quired to remain at the school to pursue their secular studies. The teachers
were not paid by the state, but were subject to the approval and supervi-
sion of the superintendent of schools. Id. at 207-09.
96. Id. at 212.
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First Amendment .. .are absolutes. ' 97 For this reason, Jus-
tice Reed would have upheld the Illinois program.
2. Acceptable Accommodation
The strict separation theory became increasingly difficult
to apply because of the difficulty of determining what pre-
cisely constitutes aid to religion in violation of the free exer-
cise clause. For this reason, the Court has more recently held
that the state may accommodate religion, so long as it retains
"benevolent neutrality" toward religion.98
This notion of accommodation was first expressed in Zo-
rach v. Clauson."9 The Court upheld a New York program
under which public school students could, at the written re-
quest of their parents, be released during the school day to
attend religious institutions for religious instruction."' Jus-
tice Douglas wrote that, while the first amendment "reflects
the philosophy that Church and State should be sepa-
rated. . . . [it] does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State." 10 1 This ab-
solute separation would constitute hostility toward religion.
For this reason, the state may accommodate religion.0
In accommodating religion, the state must remain neu-
tral. The Court defined this notion of "benevolent neutral-
ity" in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, '0 3 in which
the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute requiring pub-
lic school students to read from the Bible and recite the
97. Id. at 255-56 (Reed, J., dissenting).
98. L. TRIBE, supra note 89, § 14-4, at 820.
99. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
100. Under the program, students not released would remain in the
public school classroom. The churches made reports to the schools of
which students who had been released had not attended religious instruc-
tion. The religious organizations paid all of the costs. Id. at 308-09. The
Court distinguished McCollum by stating that this program, unlike that in
McCollum, did not involve religious instruction on public school grounds.
Id. at 309.
101. Id. at 312.
102. Justice Douglas wrote,
We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the
spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on
the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group
and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents
and the appeal of its dogma.
Id. at 313.
103. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each school day."" Justice
Clark, writing for the majority, stated that history has taught
us that the government should be neutral in its dealings with
religion, for this neutrality protects all by neither favoring
one religion over another nor religion over non-religion."0
Thus, the test of the validity of a statute affecting religion is:
"[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enact-
ment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution."' 6
Furthermore, in Sherbert v. Verner,107 the Court held that
not only are religious classifications permissible, in some cir-
cumstances they are mandated by the first amendment. The
Court struck down a South Carolina statute under which the
plaintiff had been denied unemployment benefits because she
would not accept employment that required her to work on
Saturday, the sabbath day of her church, the Seventh-Day
Adventists." 8 Justice Brennan stated that the statute forced
the plaintiff "to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and aban-
doning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand.""0 9 Only a compelling state interest
could justify the infringement on her first amendment right.
The Court found none"0 ard thus held that the statute un-
constitutionally burdened the plaintiff's free exercise right.
104. A child could be excused from the exercise by the written re-
quest of his or her parent. Id. at 205.
105.
We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is
not within the power of government to invade that citadel,
whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or
retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is
firmly committed to a position of neutrality.
Id. at 226.
106. Id. at 222.
107. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
108. The South Carolina statute denied benefits to those workers
who, without good cause, refused to accept suitable work. Id. at 401. Sig-
nificantly, those who would not work on Sunday for religious reasons were
not similarly denied benefits. Id. at 406.
109. Id. at 404.
110. The state had argued that accepting the plaintiffs claim would
invite fraudulent claims, depleting the unemployment fund and hindering
employers who needed Saturday workers. The Court held that, even if this
were not so speculative, it would not be enough to "warrant a substantial
infringement of religious liberties." Id. at 407. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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The Supreme Court has thus developed the interpreta-
tion that state action may affect religion so long as such ac-
tion merely accommodates religion."' This action must be
benevolently neutral; that is, it may neither favor religion nor
inhibit religion."' The question then becomes what consti-
tutes an acceptable accommodation of religion.
B. What Constitutes Accommodation-Direct Financial
Assistance v. Indirect Aid
The question of what constitutes acceptable accommoda-
tion of religion often arises in the context of state aid to reli-
gious educational institutions. Courts have generally struck
down direct aid but have usually upheld indirect benefits
such as tax exemptions. This section argues that, while seem-
ingly artificial, this distinction is sound.
1. Direct Financial Assistance
While the Court has held that the state may indirectly
benefit religion,"' the Court has held some benefits to be un-
constitutional sponsorship of religion. For example, the
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman" 4 declared unconstitutional two
state statutes which authorized salary supplements to public
school teachers teaching secular subjects in non-public
schools. Because both statutes led to state supervision of non-
public school teachers, the Court held that they created an
entanglement between government and religion." 5 There-
fore, the statutes were unconstitutional.
111. This accommodation, however, has its limits. For example, in
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Court upheld
an IRS finding that Bob Jones University did not qualify as a tax-exempt
organization. Bob Jones University practiced a form of racial discrimina-
tion in the admission of students, based on religious belief. The Court held
that the purpose of an institution benefitted by tax-exempt status must not
contravene fundamental public policy. Because racial discrimination vio-
lates accepted views of what constitutes justice, the Court held that the
government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education
overrode the university's first amendment claim. Id. at 592-96, 602-04. See
also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
112. For further cases discussing this notion, see, e.g., Aguilar v. Fel-
ton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
113. See supra, notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
114. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
115. The Court set out the three part Lemon test (discussed supra
text accompanying note 59) and applied the test to the statutes in question.
The Court held that the statutes had a valid secular purpose, in that the
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Similarly, the Court in Aguilar v. Felton"" declared un-
constitutional a New York program under which the city of
New York used federal funds to pay the salaries of public
school teachers who taught in parochial schools to assist edu-
cationally deprived children. As in Lemon, the Court found
that the program resulted in state supervision of religious
schools. This supervision created too great a risk of govern-
ment entanglement in the administration of religious schools.
This program thus led to the impermissible conferring of a
direct benefit upon religion, violating the Constitution."'
2. Indirect Aid
In contrast, when a program has led to indirect aid from
the state to a religious educational institution, the Court has
generally upheld it. In Meek v. Pittenger,118 the Court stated
that the financial benefit of the program went to the parents
and the children, not to the religious schools themselves. Fur-
ther, the state loaned only secular books which had been ap-
proved by the board of education. The Court found that this
program had a secular effect and therefore was
constitutional. 19
legislature intended to enhance minimal educational standards. Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612-13. However, the statutes fostered excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion in that both led to state supervision of non-
public school teachers and the resulting danger of government control of
religious schools. Id. at 612, 621. The Court did not consider whether the
statutes either advanced or inhibited religion. Id. at 613.
116. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
117. Id. at 414. In both Lemon and Aguilar, the programs struck
down involved primary or secondary schools. The Court has been more
lenient in upholding state statutes which grant direct financial assistance to
religiously-affiliated colleges and universities, on the theory that college
students are more mature and less likely to be influenced by the sectarian
nature of a school. For example, the Court has upheld statutes which au-
thorized payments to religious colleges and universities for the construc-
tion of buildings to be used for secular purposes only. See, e.g., Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
118. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
119. Id. at 362. The Court struck down the part of the program
which authorized lending instructional material and equipment to non-pub-
lic schools. The Court held that this constituted "direct and substantial ad-
vancement of religious activity," in that such aid to the educational func-
tion of religious schools resulted in aid to the sectarian mission of the
schools as well. Id. at 366.
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Similarly, in Wolman v. Walker,1"" the Court upheld an
Ohio textbook program like the one in Meek. The Court also
has upheld programs supplying to non-public schools stan-
dardized testing and scoring services as well as diagnostic and
therapeutic services. The Court held that the testing and
scoring services involved no entanglement, since the state was
not supervising non-public school teachers; the diagnostic ser-
vices involved a relationship between the diagnostician and
the child in which there was little risk of sectarian views in-
truding; and, the therapeutic services did not advance reli-
gion or involve excess entanglement because they were con-
ducted on neutral premises. For these reasons, these
programs did not violate the first amendment." 1
In addition to indirect aid to religious schools, tax ex-
emptions for religious organizations have been upheld. For
example, in Walz v. Tax Commission,"" the Court upheld a
New York statute granting a property tax exemption to reli-
gious organizations for properties used for worship only. Jus-
tice Burger wrote that, while the tax exemption provides a
benefit to religion, this alone does not render the statute un-
constitutional. Within the boundaries of benevolent neutral-
ity, the state may provide benefits to religious organiza-
tions."' Short of the Founders' fears of sponsorship, the
government may accommodate religion in a "benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist with-
out sponsorship and without interference."1 4
The Court has thus upheld those programs which have
been seen as giving indirect aid to religious educational insti-
tutions or religion generally. Such programs, unlike those
granting direct aid, have been seen as acceptable accommo-
dation of religion, within the bounds of benevolent neutrality
required by the first amendment. Some have argued that this
120. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
121. Id. at 238-48. The Court declared unconstitutional a part of the
program which authorized the loan of instructional materials and equip-
ment to non-public schools, for reasons set out in Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250. The Court also struck down a part of the pro-
gram which authorized school districts to provide transportation for non-
public school children for field trips. The Court stated that, because the
school controls the field trip, the school itself receives the benefit rather
than the children. Further, excessive entanglement would be created be-
cause use of the funds would involve state supervision of non-public teach-
ers to ensure that the purpose of the field trips was secular. Id. at 253-54.
122. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
123. Id. at 674-75.
124. Id. at 669.
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distinction is artificial. They argue that there is little differ-
ence between giving money directly to a religious school and
excusing it from paying a tax. In the end, the economic result
is the same. However, there are two important differences
between the two which impinge on the constitutional distinc-
tion: the danger of entanglement between government and
religion and the symbolic importance of state neutrality in re-
ligious affairs.12
Unlike indirect aid to religion, direct aid in the form of
subsidies poses a threat of state entanglement with religion.
Direct aid involves a direct transfer of public funds to reli-
gion, while indirect aid is passive.' For this reason, direct
government subsidies are often granted on the basis of some
qualifications and carry with them more stringent govern-
ment regulations. 17 Because of these regulations, states must
administer the funds closely. This administration creates a re-
lationship between church and state "pregnant with involve-
ment," 2 8 for it involves the state directly in the affairs of a
religious educational institution and therefore directly in reli-
gion itself. Tax exemptions, on the other hand, do not in-
volve the state so intimately in religion and religious affairs
since they are a passive form of assistance. Beyond the danger
of state involvement with religion is the danger of such in-
volvement leading to the politicizing of religion. Subsidies
must be handed out on a regular basis and thus entail more
political controversy. 2 9 Further, religious organizations often
espouse a particular political viewpoint. Direct government
involvement with religion may thus lead to political fragmen-
tation along religious lines, a danger both to government and
125. This section asserts that the direct/indirect aid distinction, on a
theoretical level, is sound. This section does not argue that the Court has
been consistent in deciding which programs constitute direct aid and which
do not. Both the Court itself and commentators have recognized the incon-
sistency. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-07 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
662 (1980); see also Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Rec-
onciling the Conflict, 41 U. PrrT. L. REV. 673 (1980); Jones, Accommodationist
and Separationist Ideals in Supreme Court Establishment Clause Decisions, 28 J.
CHURCH & STATE 193 (1986); Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the
United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409 (1986); Marshall, "We Know It When We
See It" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986).
126. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
127. Id. at 699 (Harlan, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 699 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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religion against which the first amendment protects.180
Moreover, direct aid to religious educational institutions
poses a symbolic threat to the neutrality demanded by the
first amendment. As Robert Cushman points out, aid of any
kind is extended not to individuals but to groups.'81 An insti-
tution therefore receives aid not individually, but as a mem-
ber of a group. Receipt of aid, then, depends on the group in
which the institution is classified rather than on the institu-
tion itself. Thus, religious schools receive direct subsidies as
religious schools;' 83 therefore, the religious nature of the
school is pertinent in the granting of the aid. This violates
the neutrality demanded by the first amendment, which re-
quires that the state neither favor one religion over another
or religion over non-religion. But religious educational insti-
tutions receive tax exemptions as non-profit organizations,3 3
as do other organizations formed for the cultural or moral
improvement of others. This is important, since the religious
nature of the school is irrelevant to the grant of the benefit.
Further, it demonstrates that the state does not support reli-
gion, and religion does not support the state. 34
C. Section 702 as Acceptable Accommodation
In Amos,"'5 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the section 702 exemption from federal anti-discrimina-
tion laws. This exemption, as Justice O'Connor suggested,""
seems to be a benefit to religion. It allows only religious em-
ployers to make personnel decisions based on religious pref-
erence, a benefit not allowed secular employers. Yet this ben-
efit falls into the category of acceptable state accommodation
of religion. The benefit is indirect, in that it does not lead to
state involvement in religion; rather, it leads to less involve-
ment of the state with religion. The exemption allows reli-
gious organizations to conduct their religious and their secu-
130. Id. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring). See, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305-08 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring); see also Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1680 (1969).
131. Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Con-
stitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REV. 333, 348 (1950).
132. Walz, 397 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
133. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
134. See Freund, supra note 130, at 1687 n. 16.
135. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
136. Id. at 2874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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lar non-profit activities free from government regulation
concerning employment. Indeed, a religious organization
may see all of its activities as religious. The fear that a court
might not agree may well lead such organizations to mold
their activities according to what the court might want rather
than to its own religious purpose. One commentator points
out,
If a church or other religious organization is unduly in-
volved with the agencies of government, it may become
subverted and redirect its programs to meet ends chosen by
government. Accordingly, the church becomes compro-
mised in its efforts to act in accord with its higher calling. 87
This chill on the activities of a religious organization runs
afoul of the first amendment, especially the entanglement
concerns of the Supreme Court in Lemon.'Further, the non-profit/for-profit activities distinction of
the Court in Amos is sound. The distinction at first seems arti-
ficial, since not all non-profit activities of an organization are
religious in nature. Yet the Supreme Court, like the lower
courts, was concerned with extending section 702 too far.
While the religious institution has important rights in the hir-
ing and firing of personnel in religious and non-profit activi-
ties that override the state's interest in preventing discrimina-
tion, the same cannot be said for an institution's for-profit
activities. When religious institutions enter the secular mar-
ket, they are placing themselves in an area having little if
anything to do with their religious missions. For this reason,
the state's interest in preventing discrimination overrides
whatever interest the religious group may have. In the same
way, giving an exemption to a religiously-affiliated organiza-
tion in the area of for-profit activities gives them an advan-
tage secular employers do not have. Two commentators as-
sert, "To exempt religious institutions from strictures
governing these activities is to place those enterprises not ex-
cluded at a competitive disadvantage."' 9 This advantage can
only amount to special favoritism to religion, an issue that
raises serious constitutional questions.
Thus, while the for-profit activities of a religious institu-
137. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference
with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 374 (1984) (foot-
note omitted).
138. 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
139. Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 27, at 324.
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tion do not merit constitutional protection, the non-profit ac-
tivities of such an institution are far more likely to be con-
cerned with the religious mission of the organization. While
not perfect, as no bright line test can be, this distinction
seems best to balance the competing interests of the state in
preventing discrimination with the first amendment concerns
of religious organizations. The distinction also enables the
Court to avoid first amendment difficulties of determining on
a case by case basis which activities are religious and which
are not.
IV. THE IMPACT OF Amos ON RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS
The Court's decision in Amos has special significance for
religious educational institutions. Amos held constitutional the
section 702 exemption from federal anti-discrimination laws
when applied to the secular, non-profit activities of a religious
organization. Thus, a religious educational institution should
benefit from the exemption in any of its hiring decisions, as
long as it qualifies as a non-profit, religiously-affiliated institu-
tion. However, courts may also see more of a state interest in
regulating religious schools since the state has more of an in-
terest in the education of its citizens than it does in a pri-
vately-run gymnasium or clothing mill.
At the least, under Amos, the section 702 exemption
should be extended to primary and secondary religious
schools. Traditionally, state supervision of these schools has
been minimal: such supervision has been limited to ensuring
that minimum educational standards are met, that teachers
are competent, that the school is accredited, and that the
school observes a minimum number of hours of work and
credit. 140 This state supervision satisfies the state's legitimate
interest in the education of its young citizens. Beyond this,
however, a religious organization may well see education as
an integral part of its religious mission. Parents send their
children to religious schools for a special reason, so that they
may add a religious dimension to their education.' It is in
the classroom that children are instilled with the beliefs and
way of life of their religion. For this reason, the religious mis-
sion of a school pervades the entire atmosphere, from reli-
140. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 631 (1971) (Doug-
las, J., concurring).
141. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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gion class to spelling lessons, for this atmosphere is a vehicle
for transmitting faith to the next generation.14 For this rea-
son, what may seem secular to the outsider may well be in-
tensely religious to the religious school. A court determina-
tion otherwise would seriously implicate the entanglement
concerns set out by the Court in Lemon. 43 A religious organi-
zation, then, has a significant interest in its educational mis-
sion. Because of this interest, the section 702 exemption
should be extended to both the religious and the secular ac-
tivities of religious organizations, without violating the reli-
gion clauses.
However, religious organizations do not have the same
interest in a college or university that they do in a primary or
secondary school. The students are more mature and there-
fore less likely to be influenced by a sectarian atmosphere
than are school children."' Thus, the college or university
will have less of an opportunity to instill in its students a be-
lief system or way of life. In fact, many religiously-affiliated
colleges and universities see their primary purpose as provid-
ing a secular education, unlike primary and secondary
schools. Many do not require participation in religious exer-
cises or attendance in religion classes. Many also have a policy
of academic freedom. 4 For this reason, the courts may see
the state's interest in preventing discrimination as overriding
the college's or university's religious interest. While a reli-
gious college or university has an obvious interest in hiring
whomever they choose to teach theology,146 courts may be
less willing to extend section 702 to the secular aspects of
such institutions.
Yet there are dangers in limiting this exemption to the
religious activities of religious colleges and universities. While
a ruling that a religious college may discriminate in the hir-
ing of theology teachers may raise few problems, it is more
problematic to say that such a college may discriminate in
hiring an English teacher or a mathematics teacher. None-
142. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971); see also
Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: The
Nonestablishment Principle (pt. 2), 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 574 (1968).
143. 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
144. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971).
145. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686-87.
146. See, e.g., Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499 (E.D.
Wisc. 1986).
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theless, allowing courts to decide whether a given position is
religious or secular may well lead to the confusion which pre-
ceded the Court's decision in Amos. Inconsistency in results
may leave such institutions unsure of whether they are violat-
ing the law or not when they discriminate; thus, they may
alter their actions to avoid litigation rather than follow their
own missions. This chill on the activities of religious colleges
and universities was feared by the sponsors of the 1972
amendments to section 70211 and was feared by Justice
Brennan in his concurring opinion in Amos."' 8 Most impor-
tantly, leaving such a decision to courts leads to the serious
danger of judicial entanglement with religion, afoul of the
first amendment. The exemption, then, should be extended
to the secular activities of primary and secondary religious
schools as well as religiously-affiliated colleges and
universities.
CONCLUSION
In Amos, the Supreme Court held constitutional the sec-
tion 702 exemption from federal anti-discrimination laws as
applied to the secular, non-profit activities of religious orga-
nizations. Breaking from earlier lower court decisions inter-
preting section 702, the Court held that the exemption did
not amount to state sponsorship of religion. This is consistent
with the Court's line of cases striking down direct financial
aid to religion as impermissible state sponsorship, while up-
holding indirect aid as permissible accommodation. This de-
cision is especially pertinent to religious educational institu-
tions, for it recognizes their interest in engaging in religious
discrimination in hiring faculty and other personnel. Courts
should extend this decision to religious primary and second-
ary schools and should extend it to religious colleges and uni-
versities. This extension would avoid the inconsistencies pre-
sent in lower courts before the Amos decision and the
constitutional danger of entanglement of courts deciding for
such schools which of their activities are religious and which
are not.
147. 118 CONG. REC. 1993-94 (1972).
148. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862,
2872 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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